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Definitional Vagueness in the CFAA:




Computers and the Internet play an essential part in almost every aspect
of modern society; individuals use the internet for everything from checking
their local news to paying their bills to chatting with a friend on a social
networking site. Few, if any, stop to think if they just committed a crime by
exceeding their computer's authorized access. Nevertheless, many users
have the potential to be considered criminals by the government. Unfortu-
nately, this surprising outcome often depends on what stance a court takes in
analyzing the term "authorization." This variance results from the defini-
tional vagueness in the federal computer crime statute, the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (CFAA).
The majority of the CFAA's violations require either that the individual
access a computer "without authorization" or by "exceeding authorized ac-
cess." 2 The problem facing courts is that the CFAA does not define what
constitutes "without authorization." Circuit courts are split about what the
phrase "exceeding authorized access" actually means. In fact, three distinct
approaches to understanding the term "authorization" in the CFAA have
arisen across the country: an agency-based approach, a code-based approach
and a contract-based approach.3 Each of these approaches results in courts
using a different application of the term.4 At this point in the statute's his-
tory, it is clear that the words of the CFAA do not speak for themselves and
we need some clarity.
This comment discusses the current state of the CFAA and the problems
presented by the statute's definitional vagueness as exemplified by the recent
federal district court decision of United States v. Drew. The holdings in
Drew and another recent 9th Circuit decision, LVRC Holdings, LLC v.
Brekka, conflict with other federal court decisions and raise the real possibil-
I. Brandon T. Darden is a May 2011 candidate for Juris Doctor at Southern Meth-
odist University Dedman School of Law. He graduated in 2008 from Southern
Methodist University with a Bachelor of Arts in History and Medieval Studies.
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2. Nick Akerman, Editorial, Will the Justices Rule on the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act?, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 23, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.dorsey.
com/files/upload/akerman-computerfraud-july9.pdf.
3. Katherine Mesenbring Field, Agency, Code Or Contract: Determining Em-
ployee's Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 819, 821 (2009).
4. Id. at 821-22.
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ity that the Supreme Court may choose to rule on the definitional vagueness
in the CFAA for the first time in the statute's history to provide some clarity
for the future.5 Part II of this comment will focus on the initial history of the
CFAA and explain the origins of the Drew case within the context of the
definitional confusion in the statute and the CFAA's potential misapplication
in future cyberbullying cases. Part III will clarify the current state of the law,
focusing on the three approaches taken by circuit courts and discussing sev-
eral cases that provide examples of how courts use these different approaches
and legislative history to justify their particular rulings. Finally, Part IV will
analyze the rulings of Drew and Brekka and consider if these different ap-
proaches can continue to coexist with the three current approaches without
the statute's interpretation remaining in disarray. Lockheed Martin v. Speed
and Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast will be discussed and their analysis offered
as a potential solution to help clarify the confusion. The Supreme Court's
intervention may be needed to clarify the definitional vagueness. Or a new
series of laws should be promulgated to specifically address cyberbullying
and actions that the CFAA fails to adequately cover.
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
A. The Origins of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Congress enacted the predecessor to the CFAA, codified as 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1030, in 1984.6 The original purpose of the CFAA was to fight the grow-
ing threat posed by computer hackers.7 Until its enactment, prosecutors re-
lied on mail- and wire-fraud statutes to attack the emerging problems of
cyber crime.8 These statutes were woefully inept at dealing with com-
puters-something the legislators who passed them never intended for the
statutes to address. The early statutes proved "incapable of combating com-
puter crime that did not involve interstate commerce."9 Originally, in an ef-
fort to address these concerns, Congress added certain provisions to the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 that focused specifically on the
unauthorized access and use of computers and computer systems.' 0 Early
5. Akerman, supra note 1.
6. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1030), 174 A.L.R. Fed. 101 at
1 (2001).
7. Field, supra note 2, at 820.
8. Buckman, supra note 5, at 14; see also U.S. Dep't of Justice: Computer Crime
and Intellectual Prop. Section Criminal Div., Prosecuting Computer Crimes I
(Feb. 2007) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 6 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3692), available at http://www.cybercrime.gov/ccmanual/
01ccma.pdf.
9. Buckman, supra note 5.
10. U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 7.
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legislative history indicates that Congress wanted this new statute to give "'a
clearer statement of proscribed activity' to 'the law enforcement community,
those who own and operate computers, as well as those who may be tempted
to commit crimes by unauthorized access.'""I With passage of the 1984 Act,
it became a felony to access classified information in a computer without
proper authorization, whereas accessing financial or credit information from
a financial institution or entering a government computer without authoriza-
tion became misdemeanor.12 Even though computer crime finally had its
own statute under 18 U.S.C. § 1030, Congress continued to hold hearings to
improve the crime bills, which eventually lead to the creation of the CFAA in
1986 by an amendment to Section 1030.13
The first version of the CFAA tried to strike the proper balance of ad-
dressing a new area of potential criminal activity while still not being so
overbroad as to cause federalism concerns by infringing on the States' own
rights to define criminal conduct.14 The CFAA specifically covered in-
stances when the crime was interstate, when harm was done to financial insti-
tution computers, or when the crime was perpetrated against the federal
government's own computers.' 5 Currently, all computer use is interstate, but
at that time, the CFAA presented more "penalties for fraud and related activi-
ties in connection with access devices and computers."16 The strict definition
of what constitutes criminal conduct presented several loopholes. The loop-
holes exposed the statute's deficiencies-namely that it did not address
harms occurring from anything other than unauthorized access.17 The statute
failed to address two large problems: people with authorization who still
caused harm to protected computers and individuals without authorization
who found authorized persons to do the criminal act for them.18
In response to mounting criticism from the Justice Department, Con-
gress amended the CFAA in 1986 and made several substantial changes. The
1986 Act provided greater protection to computer systems, but it also showed
that Congress still resisted political pressure to make the CFAA broad
enough to cover all computer crimes.19 Instead, the Act limited the CFAA to




14. Id. at 2.
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version nor the 1986 amendment contained a provision for a private right of
action, the 1986 version added the phrase "exceeds authorized access" to
override the earlier version's phrasing: "having accessed a computer with
authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for purposes to
which such authorization does not extend."21 This was an attempt to elimi-
nate a confusing middle ground where an individual has legitimate access to
computer data in particular circumstances.22 But that same access instantly
becomes criminal when they barely exceed their authorization, sometimes
unbeknownst to the user.23
Originally, the CFAA was only a criminal statute, but with another
amendment in 1994, civil violations made their appearance under
§ 1030(g).24 This amendment allowed for anyone damaged by a violation of
the CFAA to bring a civil suit against the perpetrator for equitable relief or
damages as well as injunctive relief.25 Earlier problems were also addressed
by amending § 1030(a)(5), "to further protect computers and computers sys-
tems covered by the statute from damages both by outsiders, who gain access
to a computer without authorization and by insiders, who intentionally dam-
age a computer."26 These changes were significant because the focus shifted
from technicalities in the understanding of computer access to the individuals
who violated the statute, their intent, and the subsequent harm caused by
their actions.27 Computer technology continues to expand at a rapid pace,
placing a burden on Congress to monitor the CFAA continually so it remains
up to date and assists the government in its goal of prosecuting cyber
criminals in an effective and efficient manner. 28 As a result of these and
further amendments in 1988, 1989, 1990, 1994, 1996, 2001, and 2002, the
scope of the CFAA and the criminal conduct it covers has expanded signifi-
cantly since its creation.29
21. Kyle W. Brenton, Trade Secret Law and The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act:
Two Problems and Two Solutions, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 429, 452




24. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (1994) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2006)).
25. Buckman, supra note 5, at 14.
26. Id. at 113.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 114.
29. U.S. Dep't of Justice: Computer Crime and Intellectual Prop. Section Criminal
Div., Prosecuting Computer Crimes 1 (Feb. 2007), available at http://
www.cybercrime.gov/ccmanual/0iccma.pdf.
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The current version of the CFAA criminalizes accessing a computer
without authorization or access that exceeds the authorization given.30 Addi-
tionally, a civil remedy is available for those who suffer damage or loss be-
cause of a violation of the CFAA.31 The specific types of conduct addressed
in the statute are: obtaining national security information, compromising the
confidentiality of a computer, trespassing in a government computer, acces-
sing a computer to defraud and obtain value, knowing transmission and in-
tentional damage, intentional access and reckless damage, intentional access
and damage, trafficking in passwords, and extortion involving threats to
damage computer.32 While attempts to commit these crimes are punishable
under Section 1030(b), the CFAA purposefully excluded acts by law enforce-
ment or intelligence agencies in Section 1030(f).33
"Unauthorized access" is not defined anywhere in the statute. But the
CFAA does indicate that the term, "can take one of two different forms: one
is to gain access to a computer system when the accesser has no authority to
do so, and the other is to gain access to a computer system with authority but
the accesser's use of such access exceeds his authority."34 Section
1030(e)(6) defines "exceeds authorized access" as "access[ing] a computer
with authorization and [using] such access to obtain or alter information in
the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter."35 Con-
gress may have seen the need to define the phrase "exceeds authorized ac-
cess" because the individuals who exceed their access, "are likely to be
insiders, whereas persons who act without authorization are likely to be out-
siders."36 Apparently Congress felt the statute addressed those without au-
thorization-those who were never supposed to access the restricted
information or trespass into the computer in the first place. Its focus shifted
to the insiders who have some authorization but who will only face criminal
sanctions if they "intend to cause damage, not for recklessly or negligently
causing damage."37 Outsiders without authorization are subject to a much
broader range of criminal punishment and can be convicted under any of the
access offenses in the CFAA, from Sections (a)(1) to (a)(5).38 However, in-
siders-who have some sort of initial authority to begin with-are liable
under more narrow circumstances and their crimes can only fall within Sec-
30. Akerman, supra note 1, at 1.
31. Id.
32. U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 28.
33. Id.
34. Jay Dratler, Special Problems in Licensing: §11.04 Breach of License as Com-
puter Fraud, LICENSING INTELL. PROP. § 11.04 (2009).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2006).
36. U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 28.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 5.
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tions (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(4). 39 Based on prior jurisprudence on the subject,
courts are very fact-oriented when defining authorization.40 Courts have seen
numerous cases involving the CFAA over the statute's twenty-five-year his-
tory and have not only held the statute was (mostly) clear in its interpretation,
but have continually analyzed the statute using the three distinct approaches
listed above. This variation in courts' analyses has led to confusion on what
conduct the statute covers, which approach is correct, or if all three play a
very specific role in the statute's analysis. Ironically, it is the confusion in
the statute and federal prosecutors' attempts to stretch the statute to cover all
types of online behavior that may eventually lead to some clarity.
B. United States v. Drew: How a Teen's Suicide Raised the
Authorization Question Within the Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine
Unfortunately, it took a young girl's tragic suicide, as opposed to a sim-
ple hacker invading restricted files, to bring the language of the CFAA before
the courts once again. Lori Drew, an adult resident of O'Fallon, Missouri,
allegedly created a conspiracy to access a computer and commit the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress by "cyberbullying" a young girl on
the social networking website MySpace.41 After the girl committed suicide,
the government indicted Drew on three felony counts of violating the
CFAA's prohibition, found in 18 U.S.C § 1030, of accessing "a computer
without authorization or in excess of authorization and obtaining information
from a protected computer where the conduct involves an interstate or for-
eign communication and the offense is committed in furtherance of a crime
of tortuous act."42
In response to the indictment, Drew brought a motion to dismiss based
on "vagueness, failure to state an offense, and unconstitutional delegation of
prosecutorial power."43 In addition, she alleged that the indictment criminal-
izes a breach of contract involving computers.44 The court found that the
felony provisions of the CFAA's scienter requirement defeated Drew's initial
challenges and allowed the indictment to go to trial.45 At trial, the jury found
Drew not guilty of the felony violations of the CFAA, but found her guilty,
per the court-permitted instruction, of the lesser misdemeanor charges of the
39. Id.
40. Id. at 10.
41. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
42. Id. at 452.
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same CFAA provisions.46 After her conviction on a misdemeanor violation,
the case no longer turned on cyberbullying issues but focused entirely on the
proper application of the CFAA-using one of the three approaches-to vio-
lations of a website's terms of service.47 The initial question before the Court
was whether a user's intentional breach of these terms of service, which the
user agreed to, is sufficient to meet the first element of Section 1030.48 After
the trial, Drew filed a Rule. 29(c) motion challenging her convictions.49
Before discussing how the court approached Drew's post-conviction motion,
it is necessary to turn to the current state of the law and explain the three
different forms of analysis that courts have used to interpret the meaning of
the term "authorization" within the CFAA.
III. CURRENT LAW
Because Congress did not define the term "authorization" at any point
during the statute's twenty-five-year history, courts across the country have
struggled to apply the vague language of the statute. As a result, three differ-
ent approaches to understanding what constitutes "authorization" have
arisen: agency-based, code-based, and contract-based.o This comment will
briefly discuss each in turn by highlighting significant cases that use each
approach, while explaining the benefits and limitations that each present.
A. Agency-Based Approach
Much like the law of agency itself, the agency-based approach to ana-
lyzing "authorization" in the CFAA is predicated on the understanding that
employees owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their employer, forcing them to
act for their employer's benefit over their own personal gain.51 The limita-
tions of this approach are apparent: there must be a fiduciary duty of loyalty
between the employee and employer. During an employment relationship,
the employer authorizes the employee to act on his behalf, but this authority
automatically ceases when the employee begins to act adversely to the em-
46. Id. at 453. The court instructed the jury that "if they unanimously decided that
they were not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt as to the Defendant's guilt
as to the felony CFAA violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030 (a)(2)(C) and
1030(c)(2)(B)(ii), they could consider whether the Defendant was guilty" of the
lesser misdemeanor violations of the same provisions.
47. Id. at 451 n.2.
48. Id. at 457.
49. Id. at 451; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c).
50. Field, supra note 2, at 821.
51. Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d
1121, 1124-25 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
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ployer's interest.52 Under the CFAA, an employee ends his authorization
when he accesses a computer against his employer's interests.53
In the Senate Reports after the 1986 amendments, the drafters of the
CFAA specifically wanted "to avoid the danger that every time an employee
exceeds his authorized access to his department's computers . . . he could be
prosecuted."54 But there are clear limits to how far someone who has "au-
thorization" will initially be allowed to go. In Shurgard Storage Centers,
Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, the court used the agency-based approach in
deciding that a former employee of Shurgard acted as an agent for Safeguard
by sending emails to himself containing confidential materials while still em-
ployed by Shurgard and with full access to Shurgard's confidential business
plans and trade secrets.55 The court ruled that Shurgard stated a valid claim
under Section 1030(a)(2)(C) because the employees "lost their authorization
and were 'without authorization' when they allegedly obtained and sent the
proprietary information to the defendant via email."56 Since the employees'
authorization ended the moment they began to act contrary to their princi-
ple's interest, the court found it unnecessary to consider whether they ever
exceeded their authorized access.57 This holding implies-and is supported
by the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Salum-that the term
"without authorization" depends on the defendant's state of mind.58 In
Salum, a jury convicted a police officer of computer fraud for releasing per-
sonnel records of individuals in his department.59 The court concluded that
"although Salum may have had authority to access the . . . database, there
was sufficient evidence to establish that . .. Salum [knew he had] exceeded
his authority by accessing it for an improper purpose."60
The leading case in the agency-based approach is the Seventh Circuit's
2006 decision, International Airport Centers, LLC v. Citrin. The defendant,
Citrin, was an employee of International Airport Centers' (IAC) real estate
division, when he breached his employment contract and went into business
on his own. 61 Before he left, he returned his company-owned laptop but
52. Buckman, supra note 5, at 3.
53. Id.
54. Shurgard, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1128 (citing S. REP. No. 99-432, at 7-8 (1986)).
55. See id. at 1123 (plaintiffs alleged that Safeguard "hired away other [former]
employees . . . who [had] intimate knowledge" of company secrets and contin-
ued to actively recruit them from Shurgard).
56. Id. at 1125.
57. Id. at 1125 n.4.
58. Akerman, supra note 1; accord United States v. Salum, 257 F. App'x 225, 230-
31(11th Cir. 2007).
59. Salum, 257 F. App'x at 225.
60. Id. at 230.
61. Int'l Airport Ctrs., LLC v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2006).
[Vol. XI336
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destroyed all of its data using a program that ensured permanent deletion,
including data that revealed some improper behavior he engaged in while an
employee.62 IAC filed suit under Section 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) of the CFAA, and
the court ruled that Citrin's "authorization to access the laptop terminated
when, having already engaged in misconduct ... he resolved to destroy files
that incriminated himself . .. in violation of the duty of loyalty that agency
law imposes on an employee."63 The court explained that "the difference
between 'without authorization' and 'exceeding authorized access' is paper
thin," but regardless, Citrin ended his employment with IAC and with that,
he terminated his authorization to access the computer.64 He breached his
duty of loyalty because "the only basis of his authority had been that relation-
ship."65 The use of agency law, and more specifically, the focus on the duty
of loyalty inherent to it, has resulted in employers favoring this approach
because employee liability will likely arise so long as the employer charac-
terizes an employee's actions as contrary to its own interests.66
Recently, the agency approach has come under attack, suggesting that
the only way to resolve the conflict between the circuits is an intervention by
the Supreme Court. Late in 2009, the Ninth Circuit handed down its decision
in LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, and the court specifically pointed out that
it was "unpersuaded by [Citrin's agency-based] interpretation."67 LVRC
hired Brekka, though the court notes there was no written employment agree-
ment, and part of Brekka's duties included using a company computer to
conduct internet marketing programs. 68 While working for the company,
Brekka regularly commuted between LVRC's office in Nevada and his home
in Florida, and he often emailed work-related documents to his home com-
puter.69 He used his own administrative user name, "cbrekka," which LVRC
gave him to gather usage statistics about LVRC's website so that he could
use the statistics in the company's internet marketing.70 Right before Brekka
left LVRC's employment, he sent a master report containing sensitive com-
62. Id.
63. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (a)(5)(A), stating "whoever knowingly causes
the transmission of a program, information, code or command, and as a result
of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a pro-
tected computer." A "protected computer" is a defined term that includes Cit-
rin's laptop. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 418.
64. Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420-21.
65. Id.
66. Field, supra note 2, at 824.
67. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2009).
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pany information to his and his wife's personal email accounts. 71 After
Brekka left the company, an employee noticed that "cbrekka" logged into the
system and accessed the company statistics.72 LVRC brought suit under Sec-
tion 1030(g) alleging a private right of action for Brekka's violation of two of
the CFAA's criminal provisions, Section 1030(a)(2) and Section
1030(a)(4).7 3
Instead of using case law, the court defined "authorization" by the Ran-
dom House Dictionary's definition as "permission or power granted by au-
thority" because the "CFAA does not define 'authorization,' and . . . unless
otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contem-
porary, common meaning." 74 Using this definition, the court dismissed
LVRC's argument that Brekka acted "without authorization" since LVRC, as
his employer, gave him authorization to access their computer files when
they gave him permission, by issuing him a password, to use it.75 In contrast
to the holdings in Citrin and Salum, the Brekka court believed that nothing in
the CFAA implies that an employee loses authorization when he uses his
computer to violate a duty of loyalty to his employer.76 Instead, Congress'
inclusion of Section 1030(e)(6), which defines "exceeds authorized access,"
implies that Congress never intended to limit the meaning of the phrase in
that way. 77 A person who exceeds his or her authorized access is someone
who has the necessary initial authorization to access a computer for a particu-
lar reason, but surpasses this reason. In contrast, a person who accesses a
computer without authorization does not have the initial right or permission
to access the computer.78 LVRC gave Brekka permission to use a computer
and access its secure materials when they hired him, and therefore he "re-
71. Id. at 1129-30.
72. Id. at 1130. The master report contained a list of the names of patients at
LVRC's Fountain Ridge Facility, a rehabilitation facility in Nevada.
73. Id. at 1131-32. A claim under § 1030(g) for a violation of § 1030(a)(2) requires
a showing that the defendant "(1) intentionally accessed a computer, (2) with-
out authorization or exceeding authorized access, and that he (3) thereby ob-
tained information (4) from any protected computer, and that (5) there was loss
to one or more persons during any one-year period aggregating at least $5,000
in value." Whereas a claim under § 1030(g) for a violation of § 1030(a)(4)
requires that the defendant: "(1) accessed a protected computer, (2) without
authorization or exceeding such authorization that was granted, (3) 'knowingly'
and with 'intent to defraud' and thereby (4) 'further[ed] the intended fraud and
obtain[ed] anything of value,' causing (5) a loss to one or more persons during
any one year period aggregating at least $5,000 in value."
74. Id. at 1132-33.
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main[ed] authorized to use the computer even if . . . [he] violate[ed] those
limitations."79 This approach shifts the court's focus away from the law of
agency and toward the employee's mental state changing "from loyal em-
ployee to disloyal competitor" and the actions of the employer, such as grant-
ing access or terminating the employee.80 Without his employer notifying
him that his previous authorization was no longer allowed and thereby open-
ing the door for him to "exceed [his] authorized access," Brekka "would have
no reason to know that making personal use of the company computer in
breach of a state law fiduciary duty to an employer would constitute a crimi-
nal violation . . . ."81 Specifically, the holding limits the term "without au-
thorization" to a person who does not have permission to use the computer
for any reason, such as a hacker, or "when the employer has rescinded per-
mission to access the computer and the defendant uses the computer any-
way."82 Despite the differences in the Brekka and Citrin decisions, the
agency-based approach still has become the favorite for employers to use
against disloyal employees.83 The code-based approach presents a more
challenging situation since the employee usually possesses the requisite au-
thorization to access the computer initially.84
B. Code-Based Approach
The second interpretation of "authorization" is more limited because it
centers on an understanding of computers and their systems, and it seems to
require that the violator possess advanced knowledge to sidestep "code-based
protections designed to limit his use of the computer system." 85 Since the
user needs to manipulate the computer into providing more access than he
was originally given, authorization cannot be challenged under the code-
based analysis in situations where individuals have been already been
granted access. 86 Since its application in United States v. Morris, this ap-
proach appears to fit within the CFAA's original goal of targeting outside
hackers from accessing computers they never had authorization to use. 87 Un-
like the agency-based approach, which is very employer friendly, the code-
based approach presents more problems for employers, as employees usually
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1134.
81. Id. at 1135.
82. Id.
83. Field, supra note 2, at 824.
84. Id. at 827.
85. Id. at 825.
86. Id.
87. See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 507-08 (2d Cir. 1991).
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have authorization, and the employees' subjective state of mind is not
considered.88
The code-based interpretation was one of the earlier forms of analysis
and is best exemplified in the Second Circuit's 1991 decision, United States
v. Morris.89 Morris, a graduate student at Cornell's computer science Ph.D.
program, had access to an account and permission to use the computers at
Cornell.90 In an attempt to show the deficiencies of computer security, Mor-
ris created a worm to prove the system's defects.91 However, he underesti-
mated its programming and the worm eventually spread across the country,
crashing university, military, and research computers. A jury found him
guilty of violating Section 1030(a)(5)(A), which provides for criminal pun-
ishment for anyone who "intentionally accesses a federal-interest computer
without authorization, and by means of one or more instances of such con-
duct alters, damages, or destroys information."92 Morris appealed, arguing
that his actions were not without authorization because he was authorized
originally to use the federal-interest computers at Cornell, but he exceeded
his authorization by planting the worm.93 The court disagreed with his inter-
pretation, saying the legislative history of the CFAA (an earlier version) in-
tended Section 1030(a)(5)(A) to focus on individuals-like hackers-lacking
the authorization to access any federal interest computer, outsiders, or "inter-
departmental" offender trespassers. 94 Congress did not want to narrow the
statute's effectiveness when individuals within the government could techni-
cally commit the same crimes.95 Individuals with prior access must also be
subject to liability for gaining unauthorized access to other computers of fed-
eral interest, which Morris did when his worm infected military, research,
and other university computers. 96 His conduct was unauthorized because he
did not use the computer for its intended purpose. Instead, "he found holes
in both the programs that permitted him a special and unauthorized access
route into other computers." 97 The code-based approach is especially effec-
88. Field, supra note 2, at 826.
89. Morris, 928 F.2d at 507-08.
90. Id. at 505-06.
91. Id. at 506.
92. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (1988), amended by § 1030(a)(5)(A) (1999).
The current version of § 1030(a)(5)(A) reads: "whoever knowingly causes the
transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of
such conduct, intentionally cases damage without authorization, to a protected
computer."
93. Morris, 928 F.2d at 509.
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tive when prosecuting hackers, but it did not play as large a role in the
CFAA's definitional vagueness debate in United States v. Drew as did the
agency or contract-based approaches, both of which focus more on the user's
relationship with the one who gives the access than any knowledge of
computers. 98
C. Contract-Based Approach
The third and final form of analysis for authorization, which the court in
Drew used, is the contract-based approach, but this too has limitations. For a
breach of contract claim to arise, a court must be able to find an explicit or
implied contract that defines the user's authorization and that the user
breached that contract, thereby making his actions unauthorized or in excess
of his original authorization.99 The usefulness of this approach is shown in
situations where there is an express contract, such as between an employer
and an employee, or like in Drew, where there are clear website terms of
service agreements outlining what is and is not authorized.100
In 1997, the First Circuit used the contract-based approach in deciding
the case of United States v. Czubinski.10 Czubinski, a contact representative
for the IRS's Taxpayer Services Decision, regularly accessed information
from the IRS's computer database in the course of his job, which included
looking at individuals' private income tax return information.102 Czubinski
knew the IRS's policy because he signed the IRS Rules of Conduct, which
stated that employees, like Czubinski, who had passwords and access codes,
were not allowed to access files outside the course of their official duties.103
He knowingly disregarded these rules and performed unauthorized searches
to observe confidential tax information, apparently with the intent to compile
dossiers on members of the Ku Klux Klan.104 But the government conceded
he did not do "anything more than knowingly disregard IRS rules by observ-
ing the confidential information he accessed" because he never used the in-
formation.1os At trial, a jury convicted Czubinski of violating the felony
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4), which required that he access the com-
puter, either without authorization or in excess of authorization, and obtain
something of value.106 The court agreed that Czubinski exceeded his author-
98. See generally United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 459-62 (C.D. Cal.
2009).
99. Field, supra note 2, at 827.
100. Id.
101. See United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1078-79 (1st Cir. 1997).
102. Id. at 1071.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1072.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1078.
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ized access, which the IRS Rules clearly outlined, but Section 1030(a)(4)
"emphasizes that more than mere unauthorized use is required: the 'thing
obtained' may not merely be the unauthorized use."IO7 In reversing his con-
viction, the court held that legislative history supported this additional
"value" requirement, and Czubinski did not deprive the IRS of any property
of value when he merely exceeded his authorized access in viewing files
outside of his official duties.108 While the court dismissed his convictions,
the holding nonetheless supports the premise that individuals are able to
"contractually define the limits of authority," and courts can use these con-
tracts to determine if an individual exceeded his authorized access.109 Per-
haps most importantly for the Czubinski decision, the First Circuit Court
concluded its discussion with a warning on the vagueness of the CFAA's
words and the inherent danger it presents because "[Czubinski's conduct,]
albeit offensive to the morals or aesthetics of federal prosecutors, cannot rea-
sonably be expected to form the basis of a federal felony."Il0
Judge Wu reiterated this vagueness warning twelve years later in United
States v. Drew. Around September 20, 2006, Drew and her co-conspirators
created a fake MySpace profile and posted a picture of a fictitious sixteen-
year-old boy named "Josh Evans," in violation of MySpace's online terms of
service.l', Soon after, Drew contacted and flirted with Megan Meier-the
victim of Drew's harassment and a thirteen-year-old classmate of Drew's
daughter.112 "Josh" continued his flirtatious behavior until October 7, at
which time, "Josh" informed Meier he was moving.113 On October 16,
Drew, posing as Josh, told Meier that "he no longer liked her and that 'the
world would be a better place without her."I14 Later in the day, Meier com-
mitted suicide, and Drew quickly deleted the "Josh Evans" account. 15
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1078-79, (citing S. REP. No. 432 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2479, 2488). "The Committee remains convinced that there must be a clear
distinction between computer theft, punishable as a felony . . . and computer
trespass, punishable in the first instance as a misdemeanor."
109. Field, supra note 2, at 828.
110. Czubinski, 106 F.3d at 1079.
111. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452-54 (C.D. Cal. 2009). The applica-
ble terms of service include a representation that all registration information is
accurate and true, the user will maintain the accuracy of their account, the user
is over fourteen years old and that the use of MySpace's services "does not
violate any applicable law or regulation." The MSTOS also prohibits a wide
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To become a member of MySpace at the time Drew created the fake
profile, a member had to meet a minimum age of fourteen and agree to the
MySpace Terms of Service (MSTOS). 116 MySpace uses two types of agree-
ments for its terms of service. Simply by visiting the site and obtaining in-
formation, a "browsewrap" agreement binds the visitor to the terms of
service.117 Conversely, if a user chooses to become a member of MySpace,
they must proactively check the box and agree to a "clickwrap" agreement,
thereby affirming their awareness of the terms of service, before they can
proceed.1S The MSTOS, which prohibited such conduct as harassment, pro-
viding false information and posting photographs without the subject's con-
sent, were not on MySpace's registration page, so an individual could
become a member without ever viewing the terms by simply clicking the
"check box," and then clicking the "Sign Up" button.l19 To access these
terms, a potential member needed to click on the hyperlink marked, "Terms,"
which appeared further down the page.120 Part of the terms of service ex-
plained that MySpace could unilaterally modify the agreement without noti-
fying its members; therefore, a member must review the MSTOS every time
they entered the website to "ensure that they were aware of any updates in
order to avoid violating some new provision of the terms of service."21
To show that Drew's crime fit within the CFAA's requirements, the
government argued that Section 1030(a)(2)(c) possesses a scienter require-
ment: the intentional accessing of the computer without authorization or in
excess of the viewer's authorization.12 2 The government believed this scien-
ter requirement eliminates any arguments concerning the statute's vague def-
initions or lack of guidelines.123 It claimed the scienter requirement was met
by Drew's conscious violation of her agreement with MySpace when she
violated the MSTOS by creating a fake account, although it had to concede
that the sole foundation of her violation of the statute was the intentional
creation of the "Josh Evans" profile.124
At the beginning of the opinion, the court noted that "nothing in the
legislative history of the CFAA" suggests that Congress envisioned a
cyberbullying prosecution under the statute.125 The relevant criminal ele-
116. Id. at 453-54.
117. Id. at 462 n.22.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 453.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 454.
122. Id. at 467.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 461.
125. Id. at 451 n.2.
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ments of Section 1030(a)(2)(C) are: (1) the defendant intentionally accessed
a computer, either without authorization or in excess of their authorization;
(2) the defendant's accessing of the computer involved a foreign or interstate
communication; and (3) by accessing the computer, the defendant obtained
information used in foreign or interstate commerce or communication.126
When a computer contacts and communicates with a website on the internet,
the user immediately satisfies the second and third elements because "a com-
puter providing a 'web-based' application accessible through the internet
[satisfies] the [second] 'interstate communication' requirement" and "the in-
ternet is an instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce."27
The court noted that three important terms are not defined sufficiently
within the first element: "intentionally," "access a computer," and "without
authorization."128 The court chose to examine "without authorization" in the
breach of contract context where "most courts ... have held that a conscious
violation of a website's terms of service/use will render the access unautho-
rized."29 Based on this interpretation, the court held "that an intentional
breach of the MSTOS can potentially constitute accessing the MySpace com-
puter/server without authorization and/or in excess of authorization under the
statue" satisfying the first element of Section 1030(a)(2)(C).130 Drew's rul-
ing is consistent with other cases, such as EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer
Corp., which held that "a lack of authorization could be established by an
explicit statement on the website restricting access."131
Once the Court established that Drew's conscious violation of the
MSTOS constituted a violation under the CFAA, the next question was
whether Section 1030 withstands the void-for-vagueness doctrine.132 Judge
Wu focused specifically on whether the statute places an ordinary person on
126. Id. at 456-57 nn.11-12; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). In 2008, an
amendment modified the CFAA to remove the "interstate or foreign communi-
cation" wording.
127. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 457-58.
128. Id. at 458.
129. Id. at 460.
130. Id. at 461.
131. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2003). In
Zefer, a start-up travel agency, Explorica, hired Zefer Corp. to build a computer
device that could take prices from its competitor's website and place them into
an Excel spreadsheet, allowing Explorica to undercut the prices. The issue
before the court was whether this "scraper" device constituted "exceeded au-
thorized access," since the public had access to the website and anyone could
take the time to gather the prices themselves. The court noted the competitor's
website did not contain an explicit ban on "scraper" programs, but if it did, the
ban notice would constitute "an explicit statement on the website restricting
access."
132. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 462.
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notice.133 Criminal statutes such as the CFAA must give a "fair warning."I34
One manifestation of this requirement is the void-for-vagueness doctrine,
which prohibits enforcing a statute containing terms so vague "that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application."135 It requires reasonable clarity in a statute's wording or
interpretation to notify the defendant that their conduct was criminal.136 The
void-for-vagueness doctrine has two requirements: (1) the offense must have
"relatively clear guidelines" so an ordinary person can understand what con-
duct is illegal; and (2) the law must give some minimal "objective criteria" to
assist law enforcement agencies in its application.137 The Court concluded
that basing a violation of Section 1030(a)(2)(C) on the conscious violation of
a website's terms of service fails both requirements, especially its complete
lack of guidelines for law enforcement.138
The Court used five arguments to conclude that the CFAA neither im-
plicitly suggests nor explicitly states that breaches of contract are criminal-
ized.139 First, ordinary people, while reasonably foreseeing civil penalties,
would not expect criminal punishment for contract breaches.140 Second, Sec-
tion 1030 does not explain which violations, if any, constitute unauthorized
access. 141 If the terms of service-like MySpace's-do not explain what
constitutes a violation, then "any violation of any term" could make the
access unauthorized, thereby eliminating a need to provide guidelines for
law enforcement since every violation is criminal.142 Third, criminalizing
breaches of a website's terms of service places the website's owner in the
position of the "lawmaker" by allowing them to define what conduct is ille-
gal. Website agreements that allow for unilateral modification by the owner
mean that conduct can be criminalized without any notice to the user.143
Fourth, the MSTOS included an arbitration clause, raising a question as to
whether any findings of unauthorized access can occur without the website
133. Id. at 464.
134. Id. at 462.
135. Id. at 463 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
Additionally, the principles of strict construction towards criminal statutes and
due process prevent a new interpretation of statute to cover conduct the statute
or a court has not revealed to the public.
136. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 463.
137. Id. at 462-63.
138. Id. at 464.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
142. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464-65.
143. Id. at 465.
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first bringing the accused party to arbitration.144 Finally, under California
law, material breaches of contract did not release MySpace from perform-
ance instantly.145 Instead, it "excuses the injured party's performance, and
gives him or her the election of certain remedies."46
In addition to failing the actual notice requirement, Section 1030 fails to
provide minimal guidelines for law enforcement and allows a violation of a
website's terms of service to establish a violation of the CFAA.147 This "re-
sults in transforming Section 1030(a)(2)(C) into an overwhelmingly over-
broad enactment that would convert a multitude of otherwise innocent
internet users into misdemeanant criminals."48 Finally, the court addressed
the government's argument that Section 1030(a)(2)(C) possesses a scienter
requirement and therefore overcomes the void-for-vagueness challenge.149 In
dismissing the argument rather quickly, the court noted that the only scienter
requirement is that the unauthorized access is "intentional," and as detailed
earlier, "intentional" is subject to different interpretations.150 If the court
were to accept the government's position, the statute would criminalize every
breach of contract regardless of the severity, making the law overbroad once
again since it fails to provide "criteria as to which of the breaches should
merit criminal prosecution."151
IV. ANALYSIS
A. A Cry for Help!
Sadly, Megan Meier is not the only young teenager to fall victim to
online harassment. Phoebe Prince, a 15-year-old girl in South Hadley, Mas-
sachusetts, committed suicide on January 14, 2010 due to cyberbullying
through "text messages, the computer, and on Facebook and other social
networking sites."152 The taunting and abuse continued even after her death,
and certain messages had to be removed from her Facebook memorial
page. 153 Facebook representatives immediately responded to the claims stat-
ing that, "most reports are 'acted on' within 24 hours and the site's policies
144. Id.
145. Id. at 465-66.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 466.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 467.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Mass. High School Girl Takes Life After Allegedly Taunted by Cyber Bullies,
Jan. 26, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,583948,00.html?test=
latestnews (last visited January 29, 2010).
153. Id.
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spell out that users can't harass, bully, or threaten anyone. Depending on the
situation, we would certainly disable the accounts of people that were engag-
ing in that kind of behavior."54 Disabling the accounts of these cyberbullies
may be an option for Facebook, but can federal prosecutors use the CFAA to
send these bullies to jail? The bullies had access to use and interact with the
networking site by joining, so the code-based approach fails.155 And there
was no duty of loyalty between Facebook and the victims of cyberbullying,
since the injured parties were not employees.156 Furthermore, abusive post-
ing can hardly be considered contrary to Facebook's interest in a strict sense
of agency law.157 A contract-based approach seems destined to run into the
same problems as under the Drew conviction, as bullies do not foresee a
criminal prosecution coming from violating Facebook's terms of service.
Has a loophole emerged within the vagueness of the CFAA that forces fed-
eral prosecutors to search elsewhere for a statute or law that can effectively
punish these bullies' conduct?
In Morris, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court's decision
not to define the term "authorization" for the jury since "the word is of com-
mon usage, without any technical or ambiguous meaning," and the CFAA
statute was clear and unambiguous.15 8 As later case law proves, nothing
could be further from the truth. Not only has the term "authorization" been
muddled and debated over in terms of what constitutes "exceeding author-
ized access" or access "without authorization," but Part III explained that
three distinct lines of analysis have arisen to tackle this "word of common
usage." In the search for clarity, courts turn to the legislative history of the
statute only to realize that support exists for whichever interpretation is
preferred. 159
B. The Impact of Drew and Brekka
While the Drew case will forever be marred with the tragic death of a
young girl, the court correctly ignored emotions by focusing on the real is-
sue: violations of the MSTOS. The court correctly granted Drew's motion
for acquittal because of the vagueness inherent in the CFAA.160 Typically,
prosecutors use Section 1030 to indict hackers, though Congress never intend
to apply it criminally against individuals who breached a website's terms of
154. Jessica Heslam, Safety "Key" on Facebook, Rep Says, BOSTON HERALD, Jan.
26, 2010, available at http://www.bostonherald.com/news/regional/view.bg?ar-




158. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 507-11 (2nd Cir. 1991).
159. Field, supra note 2, at 829-30.
160. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 468 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
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service.161 While possessing grave consequences, Drew's conduct in creating
the "Josh Evans" profile was not criminal under the CFAA at the time, and if
it was, Section 1030 still failed to provide her with sufficient notice.162 It is
important to remember that this case originated in the context of cyberbully-
ing, an issue of first impression at the time, and it is apparent the government
attempted to twist the CFAA to cover criminal conduct it was never sup-
posed to address. Much like the early wire fraud statutes that were marked
by an ineptitude at punishing hackers and gave rise to the CFAA, a new
statute-or intervention by the Supreme Court-may be needed to ensure
that these types of crimes are prosecuted. The decision of the Drew court
provides a fair warning to the government to define what constitutes criminal
conduct before overreaching with its indictments, despite the public's outcry
for justice. Overall, "the decision is a setback for the federal government's
efforts to criminally prosecute violations of end-user license agreements con-
cerning Web sites and software."63
Drew's holding "overlooks the well-established fact that a breach of
contract can, in certain instances, constitute a crime."164 Just like a "No Tres-
pass" sign has the ability to form the basis for a criminal trespass suit in some
jurisdictions, website owners can argue that they should be able to dictate
"explicitly what is forbidden" on their own pages. 165 Had the court held that
Drew's conscious violation of the terms of service was enough to meet the
requirements within Section 1030, internet users would live in perpetual fear
of breaking the law, since a website owner would control the definition of
criminal conduct, no matter how reasonable or unreasonable the terms.16 6
The court's approach explained that the lack of actual notice centered on
what "ordinary people" would expect.167 While a user could expect to be
banned from the website for violating an online version of a "No Trespass"
order, hardly anyone expects criminal penalties for violation of a website's
terms of service-especially when the violation is "harmless," as in not for
profit or not in an attempt to defraud.168 In 2006, MySpace's terms of service
read as an extensive "do not" list, prohibiting a myriad of conduct such as
"gambling," "advertising to any member," "disclosing your password," and
161. See generally TOS Violation Can't Justify Woman's Prosecution Under CFAA,
Sept. 16, 2009, available at 27 ANDREWS COMP. & INTERNET LITIG. REP. 6., at
1.
162. See generally Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 449-68.
163. TOS Violation Can't Justify Woman's Prosecution Under CFAA, supra note
160, at 1.
164. Akerman, supra note 1, at 2.
165. Id.
166. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464-66.
167. Id. at 464.
168. See id.
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curious statements prohibiting "content intended to draw traffic to the pro-
file."169 While effective in protecting MySpace from liability, these vague
and often cryptic restrictions would become the virtual Ten Commandments
of the Internet, making criminal punishment subject to change at mighty
MySpace's whim.
The Drew Court's analysis concerning the statute's lack of minimal
guidelines focused on how the government clearly targeted Drew because of
the consequences of her conduct and the shock it caused the public. Based
on the government's position, innumerable individuals, many no one would
ever accuse of being "criminals," have criminally violated the CFAA, includ-
ing Megan Meier, who lied about her age to join MySpace.170 "[T]he Consti-
tution does not permit a legislature to 'set a net large enough to catch all
possible offenders, and leave it to the courts"' to determine who is really
guilty of being a criminal and who was merely playing around on the in-
ternet. 171 Realistically, the legislature did not intend for its "net" to cover
these "criminals."
The court dismissed the government's argument that the CFAA already
possesses a scienter requirement, met by the conscious violation of the terms
of service, because the statute does not explain to law enforcement whether
every intentional breach, like a user lying about their age, is sufficient to
constitute "intent to access the site without authorization."l72 The statute
lacked any distinction about the weight of different "criminal" violations,
which made posting pictures of others without their permission equal to child
pornography.173 The MSTOS did not specify which specific actions termi-
nated the visitor's access, resulting in its application under the CFAA as be-
ing too vague. However, picking and choosing what constitutes criminal
behavior would leave the legislature's constitutional job to a website owner's
discretion. Conversely, specifying that all the conduct listed in the terms is
criminal conduct would result in a "standardless sweep" and could give law
enforcement officers the ability to "pursue their personal predilections."174
While the standard created by the court would survive a vagueness challenge
without a court finding the statute excessive and overbroad, the decision
leaves a very narrow range of what constitutes actual notice of permissible
authorization for law enforcement purposes.175
169. See id. at 464-65.
170. See id. at 466.
171. See City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999).
172. See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 467-68.
173. See id. at 467.
174. See id.; see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983).
175. See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464-68.
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C. Can We Keep It Simple, Please?
In his opinion in United States v. Mitra, Judge Easterbrook explains
why the defendant's argument fails to persuade the Seventh Circuit of his
innocence:
Mitra's problem is not that § 1030 has been turned in a direc-
tion that would have surprised reasonable people; it is that a broad
statute has been applied exactly as written, while he wishes it had
not been. There is no constitutional obstacle to enforcing broad
but clear statutes. The statute itself gives all the notice that the
Constitution requires.176
If Judge Easterbrook is right, and the CFAA is clear enough to place
defendants on reasonable notice as to what constitutes criminal conduct,
where have all the other courts gone wrong? The answer may be staring us
all in the face: we have made it too complicated. The U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Florida took this approach in 2006 in Lockheed Martin
Corp. v. Speed.177 Lockheed sued its rival, L-3, and three former employees
who left Lockheed for L-3, for conspiring together to "wrongfully obtain
ATARS trade secrets" in an attempt to give L-3 an unfair advantage in bid-
ding on the government contract for the new ATARS II.178 The employees
included a program manager who "had complete access to ATARS confiden-
tial and proprietary and trade secret protected information," a senior manager
who "had unrestricted access to [Lockheed's] shared network drives," and a
site manager who "had access to confidential and proprietary and trade secret
protected financial, technical and strategic data.179 Early in its discussion, the
court noted that it is not influenced by the decisions of Citrin and Shurgard
or the agency-theory rationale, which relied too strongly on extrinsic mate-
rial, because the plain language of the statute sufficed.180
Using the plain language of the statute and what the court considered
the clear meaning of "authorization," the court explained that Congress sin-
gled out two groups of "accessers, those 'without authorization' ( . . . mean-
ing those having no permission to access whatsoever . . . ) and those
176. United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2005). The jury convicted
Mitra on two counts of "intentional interference with computer-related systems
used in interstate commerce" under § 1030(a)(5) for interfering with Madison,
Wisconsin's computer based emergency radio system. Id. at 493.
177. See generally Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-cv-1580-Orl-31KRS,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53108, at *18-19 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006).
178. Id. at *2-3. Lockheed beat out L-3 for the USAF contract for the original Air-
crew Training and Rehearsal Support ("ATARS I") in 2000. The ATARS H
contract, which both companies planned to bid on in 2006, was valued at over I
billion dollars. Id.
179. Id. at *2-4.
180. Id. at *12.
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exceeding authorization ( . . . meaning those that go beyond the permitted
access granted to them . . . )."181 Lockheed's former employees fit within a
very narrow category of those who access with legitimate authorization, re-
gardless of the employee's intent-which Congress specifically chose not to
target in the CFAA.182 Lockheed gave the employees access to company
computers, so they were not without original authorization, and gave them
access to the particular files in question, so they did not exceed their author-
ized access.183 Lockheed's complaint does not concern the employees' level
of authorization. Its argument centers on the employees' bad behavior after
they used their authorization to access the information-something that the
CFAA does not cover.184 Finally, the court noted that the claim also failed
because the CFAA defines damage as "any impairment to the integrity or
availability of data, a program, a system, or information."185 Using this defi-
nition, the access did not cause any damage since they simply took the data
rather than impairing it.186 Without any damages and without someone who
exceeded their authorization, the court granted the employees' motion to dis-
miss.187 The Lockheed court did not need to use an agency-based, a code-
based, or a contract-based approach, but the court seems to have provided
some answers to the definitional vagueness within the CFAA. Lockheed is
not alone in this trend.
In 2008, the U.S. District Court for Arizona decided Shamrock Foods
Co. v. Gast using a similar approach to the one used in the opinion in Lock-
heed.188 Gast, a Shamrock Foods Company employee, signed a Confidential-
ity Agreement that prevented him from disclosing the company's trade
secrets.189 After being promoted to Regional Sales Manager for Southern
Arizona, Gast began negotiating with a competitor of Shamrock, Sysco Food
Services, about switching employment.190 Over a week before he resigned
from Shamrock, Gast emailed several documents containing confidential in-
formation to his personal account.191 After performing a forensic analysis on
his work computer, Shamrock learned of the action and sued under the
181. Id. at *14-15.
182. Id. at *15, *21.
183. Id. at *15.
184. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2008).
185. Lockheed, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53108, at *27-28; see 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(e)(8) (2008).
186. Lockheed, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53108, at *27-28
187. Id. at *28.
188. Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 962-63 (D. Ariz. 2008).
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CFAA, alleging that Sysco now possessed and used the confidential informa-
tion against them.192
The court began by explaining that this dispute exemplified the discus-
sion over the meaning of "authorization," and acknowledged that Shamrock
wanted to use the agency-based approach to hold Gast liable for accessing
confidential information after acquiring a conflict of interest.193 Despite stat-
ing that the plain meaning of "without authorization" eliminates any need to
use extrinsic materials, like those relied upon in the Citrin decision, the court
noted that other courts and the legislative history support a narrower reading
of the word.194 Senate reports on the CFAA differentiate between "without
authorization" and "exceeding authorized access" by distinguishing between
system insiders and outsiders: "[i]nsiders are those with rights to access com-
puters in some circumstances . . . , whereas outsiders had no right to access
computers at all (such as hackers)."I95 Simply put, accessing "without au-
thorization" occurs where the initial access is not allowed, while "exceeding
authorized access" occurs where the initial access is allowed, but entry to
certain information is not.196 Disavowing the three approaches, and using
this simplified interpretation, the court concluded that Gast possessed both
the requisite initial authorization to use the Shamrock system and the specific
permission to see the files. Therefore, Gast did not access the files without
authorization or in excess of his authorization, and Shamrock failed to state a
claim under the CFAA.197 Like Lockheed, Shamrock seems to suggest that
courts are willing to diverge from the traditional interpretation of "authoriza-
tion" and realize that either the CFAA may not cover certain conduct or the
statute no longer fits the modern crime.
i. What Brekka and Drew Can Learn From Lockheed and
Shamrock
Despite the seemingly unrelated situations that brought the respective
cases to trial, Brekka and Drew have something in common: after the deci-
sions of Lockheed and Shamrock, courts can choose to see them in a new
light. The Brekka court used the agency-based approach and the Drew court
used the contract-based approach, but both can be analyzed more simply, and
Lockheed and Shamrock provide an interesting starting point for a much
clearer analysis.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 964.
194. Id. at 965-66.
195. Id. at 966 (quoting Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access"
and "Authorization" in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596,
1630 (2003)).
196. Id. at 967.
197. Id. at 968.
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When Brekka emailed himself the master report containing sensitive
company data and later when he logged in as "cbrekka," he did not exceed
his authorization.198 LVRC, through its email service provider, LOAD,
granted him access to the statistics in their files and, as proof of his authori-
zation, gave him a user name and password to retrieve them.199 He did not
exceed his own authorization because LVRC hired him to interact with
LOAD.200 As such, when LOAD gave him specific access to those files to
assist him in his duties of conducting internet marketing programs, designed
the "cbrekka" user name specifically for his use, and had not deactivated it
when Brekka left, Brekka's accessing of the computer and the usage statistics
with the proper authorization does not seem to fall within the "very group
that Congress chose not to reach." 201 Like in Lockheed, Brekka's access of
the computer system did not cause any damage according to the CFAA's
definition contained in Section 1030(e)(8).202 He did not impair any data or
harm the system, he simply sent himself an email he created in the scope of
his employment and looked at data he used in the regular course of his
work.203 If Brekka was an outsider hacking into the system or a minor com-
pany computer programmer snooping around without access to the usage sta-
tistics, a court would be justified in finding that he accessed the system
without authorization or even in excess of authorization. If he planted a
Morris-like virus, the court could find he caused damage to the integrity of
LVRC's systems. 204 But LVRC's real complaint focused on Brekka's sub-
jective state of mind when he accessed information that he had no personal
use for and the public relations damage that could occur if his post-access
actions resulted in a list of patients in their Fountain Ridge Rehabilitation
Facility becoming public knowledge.205 Under the analysis used in Lockheed
and Shamrock and the plain language of the CFAA, LVRC's complaint re-
198. LVRC Holdings, LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 2009).
199. See id.
200. See id. at 1129-30.
201. See id. at 1130. After noticing Brekka logged in, LVRC deactivated the ac-
count the same day. Id.; Compare Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 53108, at *15 (Congress chose to ignore the group who access
with authorization), and Shamrock, 535 F.Supp.2d at 968 (holding employee
who was authorized to use computer at Shamrock and granted access to spe-
cific files did not access either "without authorization" or "exceed" his author-
ized access), with Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1135 (holding the term without
authorization is limited to someone who has no permission to use a computer,
like a hacker, or when an employer specifically removes the employees access
to use the computer, but the defendant still accesses it).
202. See Lockheed, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53108, at *27-28.
203. See Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1130.
204. See generally United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2nd Cir. 1991).
205. Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1130, 1132.
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garding Brekka's subsequent actions was not governed by the CFAA
provisions. 206
The Drew court's decision to interpret the CFAA under the breach-of-
contract analysis presents a different parallel to Lockheed's plain-meaning
analysis and requires more attention to the specific facts of Drew's MySpace
account. When Drew joined MySpace in 2006, she had to "check the box"
affirming she agreed to the MSTOS, thereby committing to the site's "brow-
sewrap" and "clickwrap" agreement. 207 However, the sign-up page did not
contain the MSTOS and visitors had to click one of several hyperlinks before
they discovered them, which allowed someone like Drew to click the sign-up
box without reading the terms. 208 While courts have routinely upheld "click-
wrap" agreements, the enforceability of "browsewrap" agreements turn on
the knowledge of the user, be it actual or constructive, before they use the
site.209 With the "check the box" clickwrap agreement on the sign-up page
and not specifically on the MSTOS page, a court cannot definitively impart
actual or constructive knowledge of MySpace's terms of service on Drew.210
Without the actual or constructive knowledge of the myriad of activities
MySpace chose to deem a violation of their terms, a court would have to
stretch to find Drew's creation of a fake profile an "intentional breach" of a
contract, which is the scienter element needed to find Drew accessed MyS-
pace "without" or "in excess" of her given authorization.211 One of the rea-
sons the court chose to void Drew's convictions for vagueness rested in the
very fact that it was unsure if every intentional, let alone unintentional or
unknown, breach of a public website's terms of service is equivalent to ac-
cessing the site in excess or without authorization.212
Like the defendants in Brekka, Lockheed, and Shamrock, MySpace
granted Drew permission to use its server when she initially signed up as a
member, subject to certain limitations within the MSTOS, and Drew "re-
main[ed] authorized to use the computer" even if she violated those limita-
tions.213 Drew retained this access even when she had no knowledge of
violating any restriction or may have been unsure what restrictions actually
constitute exceeding authorized access and which ones are harmless mishaps.
Because "authorization" turns on the actions undertaken by the one who de-
fines the scope of the access, it was MySpace's decision whether to allow
Drew to continue to use their site or immediately terminate her authoriza-
206. See Lockheed, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53108, at *15.
207. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 453 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 462.
210. Id. at 453-54.
211. See id. at 461.
212. See id. at 467.
213. See LVRC Holdings, LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2009).
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tion. 214 It is irrelevant that this task was either impossible or impractical
since MySpace gained several hundreds of thousands of new members a day
and that the company chose not to ensure every new account complied with
the MSTOS.215 MySpace never notified Drew it planned to terminate her
access; in fact, Drew deleted the profile herself216 Like Brekka, Drew had
access as an inside user, not an outside hacker who had gained access to the
site and was communicating with an authorized member.217 While it eventu-
ally led to harassment and tragedy, Drew did not exceed the authorization
that the general public has on MySpace.218 If anything, the MSTOS resem-
bles the confidentiality agreement Gast signed while employed by Shamrock,
which the court did not find relevant to his potential liability, because signing
or even breaching the contract did not change the fact that Shamrock origi-
nally granted him access to their system and the files in question.219 By
agreeing to allow Drew to join MySpace, the website granted her access to
the site and to other members' profiles.220 Therefore, Drew accessed the
website with authorization and seems to fit "within the very group Congress
chose not to reach." 2 2 1
Drew's actions of viewing another member's profile and posting or
sending comments to it did not cause damage as Section 1030(e)(8) defines
it, and Drew's actions, while eventually resulting in the death of a young girl,
did not result in a loss of anything of value through the computer. 222 Here,
the actions the government focused on are the exact same type that the com-
plaint in Lockheed addressed: that Drew's actions after she accessed the in-
formation and interacted with Megan on MySpace provided a way to try to
214. See id. at 1133-35. While discussing the agency-based approach, the court
notes that without the employer removing the "defendant's right to use the
computer, the defendant would have no reason to know that making personal
use of the company computer in breach ... would constitute a criminal viola-
tion of the CFAA. It would be improper to interpret a criminal statute in such
an unexpected manner." Id.
215. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 454-55. MySpace would only monitor new accounts on a
"limited basis" and even then usually just to make sure they followed the
guidelines on posting photographs, not the new member's interaction with
other members or on the truthfulness of their account. There were options on
the website for "Safety Tips" and to "Report Abuse," but these were merely
available for use at the user's discretion. Id.
216. See id. at 452.
217. See Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1135.
218. See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 453-55; see also Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1133.
219. See Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 963 (D. Ariz. 2008).
220. See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 453.
221. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-cv-1580-Orl-3IKRS, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 53108, at *15 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006).
222. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8).
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punish her for the comments that led to Megan's suicide.223 Without
criminalizing breaches of contract (which the CFAA does not do and as
Drew notes, ordinary people would never expect), the liability of an author-
ized individual who accesses a website within the limitations of that authori-
zation cannot turn on the supposed change in the individual's mental state
when they violate a website's terms of service, of which they may have no
knowledge.224 By keeping it simple, like Lockheed and Shamrock recom-
mend through the use of the plain meaning of "authorization" and the plain
language of the CFAA, the definitional vagueness becomes a little clearer.
Ignoring the agency-based, code-based, and contract-based approaches and
focusing on the plain meaning of the word would require courts to acknowl-
edge that there is a group Congress chose not to cover under the CFAA. But
it would finally confirm "that the CFAA was intended to prohibit electronic
trespassing, not the subsequent use or misuse of information."225
D. How to Find Clarity in the CFAA
With many different interpretations of what exactly constitutes "authori-
zation," courts and Congress are left with a choice: choose one of three ap-
proaches currently in use, accept that the statute ignores those who access
with authorization and find another way to punish the subsequent actions, or
create a new statute that specifically addresses the issues the CFAA continu-
ally fails to cover. At this point, it seems the first option is hopeless without
Supreme Court intervention, which would be the Court's first look at the
statute in the CFAA's history. 226 As evidenced by several cases discussed in
this comment, courts are set in their ways, and based on the facts of the case,
the agency-based, code-based, or contract-based approaches could all be ap-
propriate. On a case-by-case basis, these three approaches work well to re-
solve the particular issues presented to the courts. It is when you view the
entire jurisprudence of the CFAA that confusion is readily apparent. Legisla-
tive history offers little clarity on which approach is correct. When courts
turn to legislative history for answers, they quickly realize it supports all
three approaches.227 Based on the recent decisions in Lockheed and Sham-
rock, it no longer appears that an employee/employer fiduciary relationship
or a contract will guide a court towards one particular approach.228 Either
223. See Lockheed, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53108, at *15.
224. See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464; see also Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1134.
225. Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 967 (D. Ariz. 2008).
226. Akerman, supra note 1, at 1.
227. Field, supra note 2, at 829-30.
228. See Lockheed, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53108, at *12 (holding the court is not
persuaded by the agency approach despite the fact that the defendants were
employed by Lockheed); see also Shamrock, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 963 (em-
ployee's signed Confidentiality Agreement did not result in the court using the
contract-based approach).
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clarity or a detailed, systematic test explaining what factors a court can take
into consideration is needed desperately and one of the three branches of
federal government will likely have to provide it.229
Both Lockheed and Shamrock represent a promising trend of simplify-
ing the language in the already convoluted CFAA for the second option. But
this too may require the highest court's intervention to place all the lower
courts on the same page. The methods used in these decisions are far from
an obvious answer to the definitional problems within the CFAA and often
require extensive explanation to justify separation from the three traditional
approaches. 230 Moving toward this simplified analysis also presents the
problem that potential loopholes will emerge. Is a defendant in a case like
Morris, where the court uses the code-based approach perfectly, now free to
use his or her authorization to infect government computers with homemade
viruses without fear of reprimand?231 Is the only punishment facing
cyberbullies who harass one of their classmates expulsion from their high
school?232 These questions may be-answered soon if the Supreme Court
chooses to intervene and set a test for the CFAA's analysis.
Another option still exists: create new laws that specifically address
cyberbullying and the subsequent actions undertaken when an individual,
with the proper authorization, accesses the computer and then uses that ac-
cess for criminal or damaging ends. When Congress enacted the CFAA, it
did so to replace the outdated mail- and wire-fraud statutes that federal prose-
cutors used to prosecute cybercrime, which had become ineffective in ad-
dressing the new criminal conduct occurring online.233 The same problem
facing the CFAA right now has happened before, and will happen again,
unless Congress continually updates the CFAA to keep abreast of modern
computer technology or creates a new statute to address the evolving crimi-
nal conduct on the internet. Sadly, the deaths of Megan Meier and Phoebe
Prince could not be prevented, but hopefully Congress will continue to take
the necessary steps to prevent these tragedies from reoccurring. The public
outcry over these deaths has led to a demand for action and at least for now,
Congress seems to be listening. On April 2, 2009, the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives introduced House Resolution 1966, the "Megan Meier Cyberbully-
ing Prevention Act," which amends Chapter 41 of Title 18 to make conduct
229. Akerman, supra note 1, at 1.
230. See generally Lockheed, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53108, at *1; see also Sham-
rock, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 963-65.
231. See generally United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 504-11 (2nd Cir. 1991).
232. 2 Students Reportedly Expelled from Mass. High School After Cyber Bullying
Suicide, Feb. 24, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,587340,00.html?
test=latestnews (last visited February 25, 2010). (The school refused to com-
ment on whether they expelled the students who harassed Phoebe Prince, but
the Superintendent did say they "will not be returning.").
233. Buckman, supra note 5, at 14.
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like Drew's open to fine or subject "to imprisonment not more than two
years."234 The application of this law, and any similar ones passed at the
state level, will shed new light on "cyberbullying," the definition of "authori-
zation" in the CFAA, and the Drew decision.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the recent decisions of several federal district courts appear to
show there is a chance the definitional vagueness present in the CFAA will
soon become clear, the statute is not out of the woods yet. In 2001, the First
Circuit summarized the definitional difficulties courts struggle with in the
CFAA because "Congress did not define the phrase 'without authorization,'
perhaps assuming the words speak for themselves. The meaning, however,
has proven to be elusive."235 Elusive, yes; but not impossible if Congress and
the courts begin to accept the CFAA for what it is: a statute limited by the
speed at which the internet is evolving.
When Congress created the CFAA, it did so to prosecute hackers, the
outsiders who never had any authorization to begin with. Eventually,
through numerous revisions to keep the statute current, it grew to include a
civil cause of action and addressed those who had initial authorization, but
subsequently exceeded their level of access. The definitional problems in the
CFAA began to emerge when prosecutors and plaintiffs attempted to stretch
the statute's reach to the very group that Congress chose to leave alone-
individuals who have specific access to the files in question. Unless they
cause damage to these files, the individuals with the proper access do not
violate the CFAA. However, the statute has been stretched to try to cover the
actions these individuals take with this information after they access it. As
the Lockheed court correctly explained, "as much as Lockheed might wish it
to be so . . . [the CFAA] does not reach the actions alleged in the Com-
plaint."236 The CFAA only becomes vague and unclear when prosecutors
and plaintiffs use it in ways that Congress never intended it. A cybercrime
statute like the CFAA regulates conduct on the computer and addresses the
violations that occur there. It does not regulate the actions taken after the
computer no longer plays a role in the alleged crime.
With the recent decisions in Drew and Brekka, the definitional vague-
ness of the CFAA came under fire again, especially in Drew, where there
was additional public outcry for justice. Despite this, Judge Wu correctly
voided Drew's convictions for the same reason prosecutors should not have
charged her under the statute-it fails to address her conduct adequately.
234. Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. Res. 1966, 111th Cong.
(2009).
235. EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582 n.10 (1st Cir.
2001).
236. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-cv-1580-Orl-31KRS, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 53108, at *15 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006).
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Like the defendants in Brekka, Lockheed, and Shamrock, Lori Drew was an
insider who had the proper authority to access MySpace's website, especially
since it was not required for her even to read the MSTOS before she signed
up. Once she crossed this threshold, the CFAA was powerless against her
subsequent actions because Congress did not originally design the statute for
that purpose. The Internet is constantly evolving at a rapid pace, and this fact
places a burden on Congress to stay current on the cyber crimes that are
currently at issue, including cyberbullying.
The analysis presented in Lockheed and Shamrock and this comment's
proposed interpretation of the decisions in Drew and Brekka do not suggest
that the three favored approaches to interpreting "authorization" under the
CFAA are moot. On the contrary, each can play a very specific role in the
analysis of the statute, provided their limitations are acknowledged. The
agency-based approach will continue to work for the lower-level employee
who exceeds his authorization and accesses information above his pay grade,
provided the claim does not focus on the employee's change in mental state.
The code-based approach is still effective at prosecuting outside hackers who
have no authorization or Morris-like individuals whose computer knowledge
allows them to exceed their authorization. Finally, the contract-based ap-
proach, with an actual contract delegating the individual's authorization, will
continue to provide a civil course of action for breach of contract at the very
least. It is possible that the Supreme Court's intervention will affirm each of
these approaches.
Even though intervention by the Supreme Court is both plausible and
necessary, the inherent limitations of the CFAA present the same problems
as the mail- and wire-fraud statutes it supposedly replaced. To address
emerging conduct like cyberbullying, online harassment and other post-ac-
cess crimes, there is a need for Congress to create a new statute addressing
these issues, much like the reason for the CFAA's inception. To prosecute
and punish these previously unheard of crimes, there must first be a statute
that addresses this conduct and provides guidelines for its application by law
enforcement to ensure that the public has a fair warning and as such, to avoid
it being held unconstitutionally vague. While cyberbullying may have been
the issue that brought the definitional vagueness and confusion in the CFAA
to the attention of the courts, there is still hope for clarity and resolution in
the near future.
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